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LEGISLATION
NEw YoRK CivIL PRACTICE AcT, SECTION 992-ActIoNs CANNOT BE MAINTAINED IN
CERTAIN CsEs.--Chapter 491 of the Sessions Laws of 1955 amends section 992 of the
Civil Practice Act relating to encroachments of abutting walls so as to extend the
applicability of the section.
Since 1898 it has been the law of New York that where a building in a city encroaches
six inches or less onto an adjoining lot and abuts a building thereon, the property
owner whose land has been encroached upon, has one year from the time of the completion of the encroaching wall to bring an action for its removal and an additional
year to bring an action for damages. 1 The legislature in its 1955 Session extended the
law so that it now applies to all communities in the state.
Prior to the amendment of section 1499 of the Code of Civil Procedure 2 which was
the forerunner of the newly amended section, there was a need for a solution to the
problem of encroachment of abutting walls. This need was primarily caused by the
tremendous increase of the population in the cities, between 1890 and 1900, with its
resultant increase in tenement building, especially in New York City.
In Baldwin v. Brown3 the plaintiff and the defendant had mutually agreed on using
a fence as a practical line of demarcation for their adjoining land. Forty years after
the agreement, the plaintiff had his land surveyed and it was discovered that the fence
cut off a strip of land about "a chains length." The plaintiff brought an action to
recover this strip, and in upholding title in the defendant the Court of Appeals held
that practical location and long acquiescence in a boundary line are conclusive, not
upon the notion that they are evidence of a parol agreement establishing the line, but
because they are of themselves proof that the location is correct, of so controlling a
nature as to preclude evidence to the contrary.
The doctrine of practical location was revived as a method of determining title to
land on which there had been a slight encroachment by the adjoining landowner in
the dissenting opinion of Wilhelm v. Federgree. 4 The plaintiff in that case brought an
action against the defendant for failing to pass legal title to a certain lot. A building
on the lot extended onto the adjoining lot a distance of two and one-half inches and
had been standing for twenty-five years. The plaintiff's right to recover was upheld
on the ground that, though the defendant was in possession of the land in question for
twenty-five years, the parties having title to the land when there was adverse possession were infants and the statutory period did not run against them. However, in his
dissenting opinion, Justice Barret wrote, "To condemn a title upon such facts would
be a serious inroad upon the rule of repose, and would limit the practical location
doctrine to the strict conditions attaching to adverse possession. The former doctrine
is quite as important to the quieting of city titles as it is with regard to farm lands.
It has been applied in the country where the practical location has been fixed by a
where the
hedge, fence, or row of trees. It may well be applied with equal liberality
5
boundary was originally fixed by the solid wall of a four-story house."
In 1898, by the amendment of section 1499 of the Code of Civil Procedure,( the
1. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 992 (1939).
2. N.Y. Laws c. 517 (1898).
3. 16 N.Y. 359 (1857).
4. 2 App. Div. 483, 38 N.Y. Supp. 8 (1st Dep't 1896), aff'd, 157 N.Y. 713, 53 N.E. 1133
(1899).
5. Id. at 489,38 N.Y. Supp. at 13.
6. See note 2 supra.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

theory underlying the practical location doctrine was embodied in the statute. The
relationship between section 1499 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the practical
location doctrine was pointed out in Volz v. Steiner.7 It was there stated that when
the owner, whose land has been encroached upon, subsequently erects a building
thereon, he has practically located the line between the two adjoining lots. This relationship was again expressed in Bergman v. Klein.8
The statute (section 1499) narrowed the practical location doctrine by limiting its
application. It was held, for example, in Bergman v. Klein that the section was
applicable only where the owners of both pieces of land had bought buildings whoso
wall-s abut one on the other. The section was further limited to instances where buildings, whose walls abut one on the other, had been erected subsequent to the purchase
by the adjoining landowners Where the owner of the land encroached upon has not
erected a building abutting the defendant's wall, the section does not apply.10 For the
section to be appficable the abutting wall need not extend the same depth, but it is
sufficient that there is an encroachment of six inches or less. 11
Actually the statute functions as a statute of limitation. It was so stated in Volz v.
Steiner, saying, ". . . this provision is in the nature of a limitation of the right to
commence an action. It limits the time within which a purely technical right to
recover possession of a small strip of land upon which an adjoining building encroached,
and I can see no reason why such a provision is not valid. No property is taken and no
right is destroyed, except so far as all statutes of limitations destroy a right of recovery
u2
where an' action to enforce the right is not commenced within a specified time.'
Today the population trend is away from urban living. In 1920 it was estimated that
approximately four-fifths of our non-farm housing was constructed in urban areas.
However, by 1947 this estimate dropped to less than three-fifths and the trend away
from urban centers is apparently still continuing.18 With this shift to suburban living
it became quite apparent that it would be appropriate to broaden the scope of section
992 by making it applicable to all minor encroachments by abutting walls whether such
violation occurs in a city or in smaller communities.

NEw YoP.

CivIL PRACTICE ACT, SECTION 189-CHANGE 01 PLACE Or TRIAL Or

ACTIONS PENDING IN OTHER COURTS; SECTION 110-B--REMovAL ON CONSENT TO
COURTS or LmrED JURisDICTN.-Chapters 613 and 717 of the Session Laws of 1955

amend sections 189 and l10-b of the Civil Practice Act effecting practice procedures in
the removal of actions from one court to another.
Chapter 613 eliminates the exception, imposed by the Laws of 1925, upon the City
Court of New York, which exempted the City Court from a privilege enjoyed by other
courts of record.' This privilege enabled a party bringing an action in one court under
7.
8.
9.
10.

67 App. Div. 504, 73 N.Y. Supp. 1006 (1st Dep't 1902).
97 App. Div. 15, 89 N.Y. Supp. 624 (2d Dep't 1904).
Jacobus v. Willis, 74 Misc. 591, 134 N.Y. Supp. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
Goldbacher v. Eggers, 38 Misc. 36, 76 N.Y. Supp. 881 (Sup. Ct. 1902), aff'd, 82 App.

Div. 637, 84 N.Y. Supp. 1127 (2d Dep't 1903).

11. Feingold v. Marx Co., 191 Misc. 42, 74 N.Y.S. 2d 669 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
12. 67 App. Div. at 511, 73 N.Y. Supp. at 1011.
13. U.S. Housing And Home Finance Agency, The Housing Situation 18 (1949)
1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 613 amends section 189 of the Civil Practice Act to read as
follows: "Change of place of trial of actions pending in other courts. The supreme court
upon the application of either party may, and in a proper case must, make an order directing
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certain circumstances, i.e., the inaccessibility of a material witness 2 who could not be
subpoenaed by the court of limited jurisdiction, or in a situation wherein a party could
not receive a fair and just trial in a given court, to make an application for a change
of venue to the Supreme Court for a trial in another county.
Historically, it was never the intent of the legislature to exclude the City Court of
New York from the Supreme Court's right of removal. Section 189 originally existed
as section 218 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 3 but this exclusion was merely illusory
for section 319 of the Code of Civil Procedure vested the Supreme Court vith the
power, denied in section 218 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to remove actions from
the City Court to other county courts.4 With the adoption of the Civil Practice Act
in 1920, section 319 became section 22 of the New York City Court Act. This latter
act was repealed in 1926 and the substance of section 22 was omitted from the new
City Court Act adopted that same year.5 The failure to include the equivalent of section 22 in the new act did not immediately raise problems. The problem of the inaccessibility of material witnesses was met by other sections of the New York City
Court Act, which dealt with the service of subpoenas by the City Court outside the
City of New York. Principally the need was met by section 27 of the newly enacted
New York City Court Act which provided: "All process and mandates of the court
may be executed in any part of the state." 6 This rule evolved originally from section 40
of the Marine Court Act. 7 Section 40 of the latter act limited the execution of mandates
to the City of New York which was the county of New York. An exception did
exist, however, which permitted the service of subpoenas of that court in the counties
of Richmond, Kings, Queens, and Westchester.8 Section 40 of the Marine Court Act
was substantially enacted into section 37 of the New York City Court Act.) Through
that an issue of fact joined in an action or special proceeding pending in any other court of
record, except an action in a county court relating to real property, be tried at a term of the
supreme court in another county on such terms and under such regulations as it deems just.
After the trial the clerk of the county in which it has taken place must certify the minutes
thereof, which must be filed with the clerk of the court in which the action or special proceeding is pending. The subsequent proceeding in the last mentioned court must be the same as
if the issue had been tried therein."
2. Matter of Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 250 App. Div. 879, 295 N.Y. Supp. 152 (2d
Dep't 1937). It was held here that the denial of an application for the removal of an action
from the City Court of Yonkers to the Supreme Court, New York County, was an improper
exercise of discretion where all but one of defendant's necessary and material witnesses were
residents of New York County and the City Court of Yonkers vwas without power to issue
its subpoena for service outside Westchester County.
3. Code of Civ. Proc. § 218 (1876).
4. Code of Civ. Proc. § 319 stated that: "Removal of action to supreme court from city
court. The supreme court, at a term held in the first judicial district, may, by an order made
at any time after joinder of an issue of fact, and before the trial thereof, remove to itself
an action brought in the marine court, for the purpose of changing the place of trial thereof.
Where an order for removal is made, as prescribed in this section, the place of trial must be
changed by the same order to another county, and the subsequent proceedings therein must
be the same as if the action had been originally brought in the supreme court. . ." N.Y.
Laws c. 448 (1876).
5. N.Y. City Ct. Act (1926).
6. Former N.Y. City Ct. Act § 27 (1926).
7. Name changed to the City Court of New York by N.Y. Laws c. 26 (1883).
8. Marine Ct. Act § 40 (1875).
9. Former N.Y. City Ct. Act § 37 (1920).
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section 37 subpoenas continued to emanate from the City Court of New York to
the counties of Richmond, Kings, Queens, Westchester, Bronx, and New York.
The New York City Court Act of 1920 was repealed and a new court act was passed
in 1926.10 Section 37 was replaced by section 27 (quoted above) which conferred
broad powers upon the City Court, allowing its mandates to be executed in any part of
the state. This principle was challenged the year after it was established in the case
of the American HistoricalSociety v. Glenn." It was held that sections 15 and 18 of
article VI of the New York Constitution would not permit personal service of a City
Court summons outside the City of New York.' 2 In substance, the court held that
sections 15 and 18 of article VI limit the City Court's jurisdiction to the City of New
York, and that concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court exists only within the
City of New York. The determination of the Glenn case evoked the 1933 amendment
of section 27 which provided that ". . . all process and mandates of the court may be
executed in any part of the City of New York."' 3
The omission of section 319 (later section 22 of the New York City Court Act) and
the amendment of section 27 of the New York City Court Act left section 189 of the
Civil Practice Act as the sole controlling statute effecting change of venue actions and
as such, a removal for change of trial from the City Court of New York was effectively
precluded. With the amendment of section 27, the City Court being thus barred from
further issuance of subpoenas for needed material witnesses, it became imperative that
the exception in section 189 of the Civil Practice Act be deleted.
The amendment as it now stands rectifies the situation and establishes a uniformity
which it was never the manifest intent of the legislature to deny. The amendment
allows the Supreme Court, without exception, to order a change of trial, though the
county designated in the complaint is proper, if an impartial trial cannot be had in
the designated county, or if the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of
14
justice will be promoted by the change.
Chapter 717 amends section 110-b of the Civil Practice Act.' 5 The amendment
accords the plaintiff the right, in the absence of any counterclaim asserted by the
defendant, to transfer his action initiated in the Supreme Court, or a County Court
outside New York City, to a lower court, when it has been discovered that the damages
10. N.Y. City Ct. Act § 27 (1926).
11.
12.

248 N.Y. 445, 162 N.E. 481 (1928).

14.

21st N.Y. Jud. Council Rep., at 171-175 (1955).

N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 15 (1925) and § 18 (1925).
13. N.Y. City Ct. Act § 27 (1933).
15. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955 c. 717 amends subdivision one of § 110-b of the Civ. Prc. Act
to read as follows: "1. Whenever in any action in the supreme court or in a county court
in a county outside the city of New York, or in the city court of the city of New York It
shall appear that the damages sustained are less in amount than originally alleged, claimed
or prayed for in any pleading so that but for amount demanded said action could have been
brought in a lower court, such action may be transferred to a lower court having jurisdiction
thereof by order of a justice or judge of the court in which such action is pending upon the
written consent of all parties to such action to said transfer and to the reduction of the
amount of damages demanded in any pleading to a sum within the jurisdictional limits of
such lower court; provided, however, that the consent of a defendant shall not be required
in any action, otherwise transferable under this section, in which such defendant has interposed no counterclaim and in which such court to which the transfer is to be made would
have had jurisdiction of the action and over such defendant if such action had originally
been instituted in such court."
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sustained are less than originally pleaded. 16 The purpose of the amendment is to
encourage and facilitate appropriate transfers from higher courts to lower courts and
thus relieve the more crowded calendars of the higher courts.
Section 110-b as originally drafted in the Laws of 1949 required the consent of both
plaintiff and defendant prior to the transfer of any action. The need for the amendment was cited in such cases as Berossey v. Kleiner,17 where it was held that the
Supreme Court lacked the power to transfer the case to the City Court without the
defendant's consent.
Under the new amendment if a defendant has asserted a counterclaim the transfer
cannot be made without the consent of all parties. Consent alone, of all the parties
involved will not be competent to dispel jurisdictional requirements when the court
to which the transfer is sought lacks jurisdiction. The rule, therefore, of such cases
as Friedman v. Strad' 8 would not be changed by the amendment. In that case plaintiff
moved for the transfer of a negligence action from the Supreme Court, Bronx County.
The defendants were residents of, and were served in Nassau County. Plaintiff's motion
to remove the action to the Municipal Court, Borough of the Bronx, which would not
have had jurisdiction of the case if its process had been served initially in Nassau, was
denied. Thus the amendment does not allow the plaintiff to do indirectly what is
forbidden to him directly. Jurisdictional requirements cannot be circumvented.
The amendment fulfills a definite need. It presents a moderate and reasonable
solution to the problem of crowded calendars. Through it, transfers will be facilitated
and congestion in the courts partially alleviated. 19
NEW YonK CrnW PRAcicEa AcT, SECTIONs 49 AND 1139. MARARGE-AN.tTUm ENT
roR FRAu>--LnwiroN.--Chapter 257 of the Session Laws of 1955 amends sections
49 and 1139 of the Civil Practice Act so as to provide a statute of limitations in
actions to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud.
Section 49 sets forth those actions which must be commenced within three years
after the cause of action has accrued. It is amended by adding thereto an action to
annul a marriage on the ground of fraud.
Section 1139 of the Civil Practice Act provides a cause of action for the annulment
of a marriage on the grounds that it was contracted as a result of force, duress or
fraud. The section as amended incorporates by reference the section 49 limitation of
three years from the discovery of the fraud by the defrauded spouse. The action may
be maintained by the defrauded spouse or by the parent or guardian of the person
whose consent was obtained by fraud or by any relative of the defrauded party who
has an interest to avoid the marriage.
Section 1139 was derived without change from section 1750 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which was originally taken from sections 30 and 31 of the Revised Statutes.1
In 1848 Montgomery v. Montgomery,2 interpreting sections 30 and 31, held that
since an annulment action was an equitable action, it was subject to the statutory
16. An added factor encouraging the plaintiff in moving for a transfer is the fact that
the county courts outside the City of New York have a raised jurisdiction of 1-6,OO as of
January 1, 1954. N.Y. Laws c. 3 (1954).
17. 197 Aflsc. 407, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
18. 203 Adisc. 170, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
19. See note 14 supra.
1. 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 143, § 30,31 (1832).
2. 3 Barb. Ch. 132 (1848).
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limitation of section 513 of the Revised Statutes, which provided that allequitable
actions based on fraud must be instituted within six years after the discovery of such
fraud. Substantially, sections 30 and 31 remained unchanged until 1880, when they
were replaced by section 1750 of the Code of Civil Practice.
Section 1750 changed the law by providing that an annulment action based on fraud
could be brought at any time.4 Thus annulment actions for fraud were excluded from
the statutory time limitations applicable to other actions based on fraud.
In 1920, with the repeal of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 1750 was substituted without change by section 1139 of the Civil Practice Act. The most definitive
statement of the law on section 1139 is found in Campbell v. Campbell.5 The court
struck out a defense based on section 53 of the Civil Practice Act,0 which provides
that where no specific time limit has been established by the Civil Practice Act, the
action, must be brought within ten years. Nor did the court recognize the defense based
on section 48,7 which sets out the actions that are barred, if not brought within the
statutory limitation of six years. The court held that the construction of section 1139
was such that it precluded all affirmative defenses (including the defense of laches)
based upon a period of time, regardless of how they may be denominated. The section
thus limited the defendant to a general denial of the alleged fraud and to the one
affirmative defense stated, namely, that the parties voluntarily cohabitated as husband
and wife with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud.
The reasoning of the Campbell decision was followed in Gilels v. Gilels,8 which also
held that neither time limitation nor laches was a valid defense.
The defense of laches again was raised in the case of Vonbiroganis v. Von Brack.0
There the court denied the defense of statute of limitations and of laches, but indicated
that a long delay in bringing the suit, while not an absolute bar, may justify the refusal
of the annulment, especially where the case is not a strong one or not clearly proved
or where it may be taken as evidence of waiver or acquiescence or as indicating an
ulterior motive.
The law on the question of time limitation in an annulment action was, until now,
essentially that of the Campbell case, i.e., that the action could be brought at any time.
However, there had been legislative activity to modify the case law.
In 1947 a bill was introduced to amend section 1139 by providing a five year limitation in instituting the action, the time to run from the date of marriage. Criticism of
the bill was expressed by the Committee on State Legislation of the Bar Association
of the City of New York. The Commission felt that "the courts have ample power
to deny an annulment where there is proof of long delay or acquiescence. No statutory
authority is required for the exercise of that power."' 1
A similar bill was again introduced in the 1954 Session. It would have amended
section 49 of the Civil Practice Act, so that an annulment action for fraud would have
to be brought within three years of discovery of the fraud. Governor Dewey vetoed
the bill and, in quoting the Committee on State Legislation of the Bar Association of the
3. 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 301, § 51 (1832).
4. N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 1750 (1880).
5. 239 App. Div. 682, 268 N.Y. Supp. 789 (1st Dep't ), aff'd, 264 N.Y. 616, 191 N.E.
592 (1934).
6. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 53 (1920).
7. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48 (1921).
8. 159 Misc. 31, 287 N.Y. Supp. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd 247 App. Div. 922, 288 N.Y. Supp.
882 (4th Dep't 1936).
9. 64 N.Y. Supp. 2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
10. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n. Report, No. 74, Feb. 17, 1947.
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City of New York, said, "this amendment would work a significant change in the law
as set down in the Campbell case, which result was based on the construction of
Section 1139 ....
As the bill would change the present rule without amending Section 1139 an inconsistency could arise."" It would have been possible for a relative
or guardian to bring an action for annulment which could have been denied by the
statute of limitations to the deceased defrauded spouse. Thus the bill's purpose would
not be accomplished, without amending section 1139 at the same time. This technical
objection was cured in the present amendment but the Committee of the Bar Association of the City of New York stated, "the purpose of the bill, to bar such actions
where the fraud had been known to the other party for many years, is commendable.
However, if the bill is also intended to discourage collusive annulment actions, it is not
well calculated to achieve that end. . . for the statute of limitations is a defense which
need not be asserted, and, presumably, a collusive defendant would not assert iL"' 2"
There is no doubt the amendment attempts to block collusive annulment actions, by
limiting the time within which the action may be brought. The criticism of the Bar
Committee is a valid one. The bill would have been more effective, if, as a matter of
evidence, it required the plaintiff to prove that the time limitation had not run. Such
a provision would make consideration of the time period mandatory upon the court
and would not have left it to the discretion of the defendant.
Thus, as the bill stands, it will do little more than to prevent stale actions. Reform
is needed to prevent collusive actions but can it be achieved through stopgap legislation?

NEW YoRm

CIVI

PRACTICE

ACT, SECTION 354.-PRIVILEGED COMrUNICATIONS.-

Chapter 466 of the Session Laws of 1955 amends the Civil Practice Act by clarifying
the application of sections relating to confidential communications.
At common law, communications made by a patient to his physician for the purpose
of receiving medical treatment, even though made in the strictest confidence, were not
privileged.' The privilege was first established in New York in 1828 by statute which
read: "No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be allowed to
disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient, in a
professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe
for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon."- In 1876, the
rule was embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure. 3 The rule was later incorporated in
the Civil Practice Act.4
The Court of Appeals held that the prohibition against a physician's disclosure of
information acquired while attending a patient ".... means not only communications
received from the lips of the patient but such knowledge as may be acquired... from
the statement of others who may surround him at the time, or from observation of
his appearance and symptoms. ... Information thus acquired is clearly within the
scope and meaning of the statute." 5
In 1891, the Code of Civil Procedure was amended so as to provide for two types of
waiver of the privilege. One type permitted waiver at the trial by the patient himself.
11. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legis. at 415-16 (April 5, 1954).
12. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legis. at 218 (March 7, 1955).
1. Edington v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 77 N.Y. 564 (1879).
2. 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 405 (1828).
3. Code of Civ. Proc. § 834 (1876).
4. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 352 (1920).

5. Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876).
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The other type permitted waiver by the executor of a deceased patient. This allowed
the physician to reveal any information acquired while attending the deceased patient
".. . except confidential communications and such facts as would tend to disgrace
the memory of the patient . . . ."0 Later, an amendment extended the right of waiver
"a professional or
to the surviving spouse or any other party in interest. 7 In 1904,
8
registered nurse" was included in the privilege and in the waiver.
The question as to what the legislature meant by confidential communications arose
in Matter of Cashman.9 Here the question, "at that time in 1932, what did you find in
connection with her condition?" was excluded on the grounds that it was too broad
and all inclusive, and in violation of section 354 of the Civil Practice Act. Also excluded
was, "doctor, based upon your experience and observation of her and your treatment
of her . . . in your opinion . . . was she of sound and disposing mind and memory?"
The Surrogate ruled that this question also was too broad and permitted the witness to
base his answer upon confidential communications made to him by the decedent. "By
'observation' the witness might very well have based his opinion upon not only his
observation by his sense of sight but have supplemented this means of acquiring knowledge by questions to or voluntary oral statements by the decedent." 10 When the
Surrogate's decision was affirmed without opinion by both the Appellate Division and
the Court of Appeals," it became the controlling precedent in New York.
Matter of Cashman did not give any iron-clad rule as to what would be considered a
confidential communication. Such a rule was given in 1954 in Matter of Coddington.12
In this case the Court of Appeals ruled that physicians be permitted to testify in such
cases, in event of waiver, to only such matters as they could have noticed and described
as laymen. This interpretation seemed to nullify the provision for waiver. Furthermore, this meant that the physician could not testify as freely as a layman, in view
of the limitation that no facts could be admitted which would tend to disgrace the
memory of the deceased patient. This was a restriction which did not apply to laymen.
Thus, in this type of case, a physician lost his value not only for expert testimony, but
for any testimony at all.
The Civil Practice Act has now been amended, eliminating the exception for confidential communications. Now, upon waiver, a physician may disclose any information
communications as would tend to disgrace the memory of the
except such confidential
3
deceased patient.'
Now the courts of New York are faced with the task of determining what facts tend
to disgrace the memory of the deceased patient. There are not many cases touching
upon this point since most cases have been decided on the confidential communication
aspect of the statute. It has been held that testimony stating that the deceased had
been suffering from tuberculosis 14 or that the decedent died as the result of a mouth
infection' 8 do not tend to disgrace his memory.
6.
7.

N.Y. Laws c. 381 (1891).
N.Y. Laws c. 295 (1893).

8.

N.Y. Laws c. 331 (1904).

9.
Supp.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
1939).
15.

159 Misc. 881, 289 N.Y. Supp. 328 (Surr. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 250 App. Div. 871, 297 N.Y.
I50 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 681, 21 N.E. 2d 193 (1939).
159 Misc. at 885, 289 N.Y. Supp. at 333.
See note 9 supra.
307 N.Y. 181, 120 N.E. 2d 777 (1954).
N.Y. Sess. Laws c. 466 (1955).
Murray v. Physical Culture Hotel, 258 App. Div. 334, 16 N,Y.S. 2d 978 (4th Dep't
Waldron v. State, 193 Misc. 113, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 822 (Ct. of Claims 1948).
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There is a split of authority as to whether or not testimony concerning suicide tends
to disgrace the patient's memory. In a recent case, the Appellate Division ruled that
testimony that the deceased had suicidal tendencies tended to disgrace the decedent's
memory.' 6 It does disgrace the decedent's memory if a physician testifies that the
decedent admitted attempting suicide.' 7 However, another New York court has held
that, unless the circumstances leading to suicide are in themselves immoral or disgraceact of self-destruction does not tend to disgrace the memory of the
ful, the mere
8
decedent.'
Undoubtedly, the present amendment, which was approved by the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York,' 9 is a step in the right direction. For.is there any valid
reason for the physician-patient privilege to exist? In very few cases are communications
to a physician intended to be confidential. On the contrary, innumerable people are eager
to speak at great length concerning their various ailments. It is not essential to the
existence of the physician-patient relationship that the communications be regarded as
confidential. People would still consult physicians even if there were no guarantee that
facts which might disgrace their memories would be legally suppressed. It is also
thought that the injury caused to the relationship by disclosure of all the facts is not as
great as the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation.m°
Perhaps it is not yet time to abolish completely the physician-patient privilege. However, it is certainly proper to allow a physician to reveal all the facts when the privilege is waived. In probate litigation, why should a party be deprived of what should
be rightfully his, merely to preserve the memory of the decedent?
For those who are still convinced that the reputation of the decedent must be
protected at all costs, a similar situation can be found in the field of defamation. Libel
or slander upon the memory of a deceased person gives his relatives no cause of
action.2 ' If the law allows one to defame a decedent, without liability, why should it
prevent a physician from telling the truth about him?

NEW YoRx CVn. PRACTIcE AcT, SECTION 1296.--PRoCEEDEnG AGAINST BODY OR
Orrmcn.--Chapter 661 of the Session Laws of 1955, effective September 1, 1955,
amends section 1296 of the Civil Practice Act so as to permit the courts to review the
measure of punishment, penalty or discipline imposed by administrative agencies.
Section 1296 limited the judicial review of an administrative determination to seven
questions only. The amendment adds a new subdivision to section 1296, to be subdivision 5-a, so as to specify an additional question which may be considered in reviewing the validity of an administrative determination: "5-a. Whether the respondent
abused his discretion in imposing the measure of punishment or penalty or discipline
involved in the determination."' Subdivision 5-a was added on recommendation of the
Committee on Administrative Law of the New York State Bar Association to counter2
act case law which consistently refused such judicial review. The change was also
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Eder v. Cashin, 281 App. Div. 456, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 165 (3d Dep't 1953).
Meyer v. Knights of Pythias, 178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. 111 (1904).
Bolts v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 20 N.YS. 2d 675 (City Ct. of N.Y. 1940).
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legis. at 431 (April 21, 1955).
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285, (3d ed. 1940).
Rose v. Daily 1irror, Inc., 284 N.Y. 335,31 N.E. 2d 182 (1940).

1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 661.
2. N.Y. State Bar Bulletin, June 1955, at 172; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on
Administrative Law, at 200-04 (1955).
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recommended by The Committee on State Legislation of The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York.3 This same amendment of 1296 was passed by the legislature in 1954 but was vetoed by Governor Dewey. In the veto message Governor Dewey
said that the courts ". . . have declined in most instances to consider matters relating
to the punishment or penalty imposed. Nevertheless, where excessive penalties have
' 4
been imposed, means for judicial rectification have not been found entirely lacking.
The statement in the veto message that "means for judicial rectification have not been
found entirely lacking" apparently has reference to the case of Tompkins v. Board of
Regents;5 but in view of subsequent treatment of the Tompkins case by the Court of
Appeals (especially in Barsky v. Board of Regents6 ) itwas practically unavailing as a
precedent.
Most of the early cases which refused to review the extent of the punishment imposed
by administrative bodies were concerned with disciplinary action imposed on firemen
and policemen for breaches of duty or departmental regulation. In People ex rel. Kent
v. Board of Fire Commissioners7 the relator was dismissed from service as a fireman
for being intoxicated. General Term reduced the commissioners' dismissal order to a
six months' suspension. The Court of Appeals reversed, asserting that General Term
had no power to review the commissioners' discretion with respect to the punishment
imposed. The same reasoning prevailed in People ex rel. Masterson v. French8 and
People ex rel. McAleer v. French.0 In the latter case the court noted that the dismissal
from the police force seemed to be a very harsh punishment but stated that ". . . the
extent of the punishment rested entirely in the discretion of the commissioners, and
neither the Supreme Court nor this court has any jurisdiction to interfere therewith."' 0
In People ex rel. Morrissey v. Waldo" Judge Cardozo speaking for the court said, "In
our opinion, the ruling of the Appellate Division is not to be sustained. We have
nothing to do with the measure of the punishment inflicted on the relator. That is a
matter for the commissioner."' 12 In People ex rel. Regan v. Enright'3 the commissioner
imposed a fine on relator for carelessly discharging his revolver and thereby injuring
an innocent bystander. The Court of Appeals again reversed the Appellate Division's
attempt to modify the penalty imposed.
These are but instances of the numerous cases in which the same principle was
applied. However, appeals from the punishment or discipline imposed by administrative agencies continued.
The rule forbidding review of the penalty imposed has been followed in cases other
than those involved with the disciplining of policemen and firemen. Notably and most
recently it was applied in Sagos v. O'Connell14 and Barsky v. Board of Regents.16 In
the Sagos case, appellant suspended respondent's liquor license for twenty days. The
3. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legis. at 299-301 (March 15,
1954) ; at 359-62 (March 14, 1955).
4. McKinney, Session Laws of State of New York 1954, at 1423.
5. 299 N.Y. 469, 87 N.E. 2d 517 (1949) ; see note 2 supra.
6. 305 N.Y. 89, 111 N.E. 2d 222 (1953).
7. 100 N.Y. 82, 2 N.E. 613 (1885).
8. 110 N.Y. 494, 18 N.E. 133 (1888).
9. 119 N.Y. 502, 23 N.E. 1061 (1890).
10. Id. at 507, 23 N.E. at 1062.
11. 212 N.Y. 174, 105 N.E.829 (1914).
12. Id.at 177, 105 N.E. at 829.
13. 240 N.Y. 194, 148 N.E. 187 (1925).
14. 301 N.Y. 212, 93 N.E.2d 644 (1950).
15. 305 N.Y. 89, 111 N.E. 2d 222 (1953).
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Court of Appeals denied the Appellate Division authority to review the measure of
punishment imposed, stating, "... . we find no provision for the judicial review of the
measure of punishment imposed as an incident to disciplinary action ordered by an
...
16 In the Barsky case where respondent had suspended
administrative board.
the licenses of two physicians and reprimanded another, the court said, "As to the
assertions, by appellants, that the Regents dealt too severely with them, or that the
Regents, in deciding on punishment, ignored weighty considerations and acted on
matters not proper for consideration, it is enough to say that we are wholly without
jurisdiction to review such questions .... -17 However, in this latter case, Judge Fuld
in a strongly worded dissent attacked the precedents and underscored the need for the
present amendment. Said he, "This court has heretofore declined, in most instances,
to consider the measure of discipline imposed by an administrative agency . ... That
is a subject, we have concluded, that rests in the discretion of the agency. However,
there is no more reason here, than with other discretionary matters, why some limit
should not be imposed on the exercise of discretion, and judicial review sanctioned,
where that exercise is unsupportable on rational grounds and becomes arbitrary and
capricious."18
Judge Fuld's argument is a sound one. The penalty imposed of itself, as well as the
finding of guilty conduct, might very well result from an arbitrary determination. It
is no answer to say, as do some critics of the amendment, that it will encourage
"... every single litigant to raise the question of penalty and, pointing to this provision, to attempt to inveigle the court to change it."'1 The amendment does not abolish
penalties; it merely gives a power to review an abuse of discretion in administering
penalties. The courts have not been deluged by petitioners seeking to change administrative determinations under the seven subdivisions of section 1296 as it existed prior
to this amendment, and there is no reason to believe that such will now occur.

NEW YoRx Cr PRAcTICE AcT, SECTIONs 290, 291, 296, 299 AND 405.-PODUcio
or BooKs AND PAaEss-NoTic.-Chapter 497 of the Session Laws of 1955 amends
the Civil Practice Act relating to notice to require a party to produce books and
papers upon the taking of a deposition.
Section 290 of the Civil Practice Act, which prescribes the contents of a notice for
the taking of testimony, is amended by the addition of a new subdivision, which
eliminates the necessity for an order or subpoena duces tecum formerly required to
obtain the production of books and papers at a pre-trial examination.
The amendment to section 291 permits a party to raise a question as to the right
to have books and papers produced, by moving to vacate or modify the notice given
under section 290.
Amended section 299 imposes the penalty of striking out a party's pleading where
there is a wilful failure to produce the books and papers required either by an order
or notice. This extends the remedy which previously existed only for failure of a party
to appear for examination.
An amendment to section 405, a general provision relating to penalties, including
contempt, conforms its provisions with those of the amended section 299.
The practice of permitting pre-trial use of books and papers has evolved gradualy
16. 301 N.Y. at 215, 93 N.E. at 645.
17. 305 N.Y. at 99, 111 N.E. 2d at 226.
18. Id. at 107-08, ill N.E. 2d at 231-32.

19.

McKinney, Session Laws of State of New York 1955, Memorandum of State Educa-

tion Department, at 1786.
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in New York over a period of more than seventy-five years. The practice under the
Code of Civil Procedure was similar to the examination which may be held pursuant to
a notice or order today. Such production of books and papers could be obtained only
with a subpoena duces tecum' and their evidential use was limited to refreshing the
recollection of a witness. If the records did not refresh the recollection of the witness,
they could not be introduced separately as evidence. An amendment was made to the
Code in 1880,2 whereby a court could compel the production of the books and papers
of a corporation or association but their use was restricted to refreshing the recollection
of a witness. 3 An amendment to the Code in 1911 provided for the introduction into
evidence of the books and papers of a corporation if the examination was obtained
pursuant to an order. 4 In 1921, the Civil Practice Act extended this provision to any
party or person, corporate or otherwise. 5
Prior to 1953, an examination before trial could be initiated by an order0 or notice. 7
The production of books and papers, however, could be compelled only by means of a
subpoena duces tecum or an order.8 Books and papers produced after service of an
order were subject to examination and inspection and could be received in evidence as
to specific entries and accounts, while those produced after a subpoena duces tecum
were not subject to such usage. 9 When the examination was obtained pursuant to a
notice, the books and papers could be obtained only if the notice was accompanied
by service of a subpoena duces tecum. 10 The use of the papers produced was then
limited to refreshing the recollection of the witness."' If the witness claimed that the
papers did not, in fact, refresh his recollection, the examining party was precluded from
any further inspection of such books and papers unless it should appear from the
testimony that the entry is in the handwriting of the witness.' 2 If the books and papers
did refresh the recollection of the witness, such books and papers could then be marked
for identification.
Where the examination was initiated by an order and a request was made for the
production of books and papers, such papers were subject to a limited inspection as to
specific entries and could be introduced into evidence whether or not they did refresh
the recollection of the witness. 13 By the addition of a new subdivision to section 296
in 1953, the legislature removed the distinction in the use to which books and papers
duces tecum could be put and those which were proproduced pursuant to a subpoena
14
duced in response to an order.
1. Rheims v. Bender, 185 App. Div. 61, 172 N.Y. Supp. 543 (2d Dep't 1918); In re
Sands, 98 App. Div. 148, 90 N.Y. Supp. 749 (1st Dep't 1904).

2. N.Y. Laws c. 536 adding subdiv. 7 to § 872 (1880).
3.
4.

Duffy v. Consolidated Gas Co., 59 App. Div. 580, 69 N.Y. Supp. 635 (1st Dep't 1901).
N.Y. Laws c. 781, N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 872 (7) (1911).

5. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 296 (1921); Fey v. Wisser, 206 App. Div. 520, 202 N.Y. Supp.
30 (2d Dep't 1923).
6. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 293 (1895).
7. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 290 (1923), later amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws c. 497 (1955).
8. N.Y. City Car Advertising Co. v. Regensburg & Sons, Inc., 205 App. Dlv. 705, 200
N.Y. Supp. 152 (1st Dep't 1923).
9. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 296 (1921), later amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws c. 497 (1953);
N.Y. City Car Advertising Co. v. Regensburg & Sons, Inc., 205 App. Div. 705, 200 N.Y. Supp.
152 (1st Dep't 1923).
10. Soehner v. Aplo Clothing Co., 251 App. Div. 793, 296 N.Y. Supp. 701 (4th Dep't 1937).
11. Klapp v. Merwin, 122 Misc. 708, 203 N.Y. Supp. 694 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
12. Bigio v. Zaike, 102 Misc. 561, 170 N.Y. Supp. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
13. Schulz v. Agfa Ansco Corp., 149 Misc. 821, 269 N.Y. Supp. 300 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
14. N.Y. Laws c. 49 (1953).
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The present amendments eliminate the requirements for an order or subpoena duces
tecum. The books and papers can now be obtained pursuant to a simple notice, thus
following the trend in New York toward more liberal pre-trial examination rules.1 5
NEw Yoa Civi PRACrICE Act, SECTION 573-STAY OF PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAr.Chapter 654 of the Session Laws of 1955 amends section 573 of the Civil Practice Act 1
so as to allow a lower court to retain jurisdiction of a motion for a. new trial made
under sections 549 and 552 of this act for a period of twenty days from the filing of
a notice of appeal.
Prior to the enactment of this amendment, which was effective September 1, 1955,
there was a possibility that the very wording of section 573 might frustrate in part the
historical privilege of a lower court to retain jurisdiction of a motion for a new trial
while its judgment was being appealed. This situation arose from the section's provision
for a five day extension of the stay of execution after affirmance or modification by
the appellate court.2 This five day period was subject to interpretation as a time during
which no motion for a new trial could be made in the lower court.
The New York courts have not considered the perfecting of an appeal and the resulting stay as precluding the making of a motion for a new trial either at trial or
special term. Indeed, in a proper case, the time to make such a motion has been
extended even past the execution of judgment.a
Consequently, the present amendment to section 573 will clarify this section to the
extent that the special five day stay therein provided will not be regarded as a period
"in vacuo" for the granting of motions for a new trial under sections 5494 and 552.5
Section 573 of the Civil Practice Act is derived substantially from section 1310 of
the Code of Civil Procedure0 which in turn was a consolidation of sections 339 and
342 of the old Code of Procedure.7 The section's inherent purpose was to protect the
party appealing from having the judgment enforced while the controversy was pending.
It is well settled in New York that unless the appeal is being taken on behalf of the
people or a domestic municipal corporation, the perfecting of an appeal does not. in
itself, stay execution of the judgment.8 Where an appellant neglects to obtain a stay of
15. See Rules Civ. Proc. 121-a (1952), which permits all four departments to have
examinations before trial regardless of the burden of proof. It also permits such examinations
in personal injury actions.
1. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 573 (1945).
2. Ibid.
3. "The correct rule appears to be that a motion for a new trial may be entertained not
only after the entry of judgment, but during the pendency of an appeal therefrom and even
subsequent to the collection of the judgment." Gentile v. Marcus, 55 N.Y. Supp. 2d 901, 903
(Sup. Ct. 1945); accord, Tracey v. Altmyer, 46 N.Y. 598 (1871); Scott v. Town of North
Salem, 138 App. Div. 25, 122 N.Y. Supp. 497 (2d Dep't 1910); James McCreery Realty Corp.
v. Equitable National Bank, 52 Misc. 300, 102 N.Y. Supp. 975 (N.Y. City Court 1907), aff'd
54 M sc. SOS, 104 N.Y. Supp. 959 (App. T. Ist Dep't 1907), aff'd, 123 App. Div. 358, 107
N.Y. Supp. 1080 (1st Dep't 1908) ; Smith v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 60 App. Div. 467, 69 N.Y.
Supp. 975 (2d Dep't 1901).
4. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 549 (1951).
5. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 552 (1890).
6. N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1310 (1917).
7. N.Y. Code of Proc. §§ 339 (1895), 339a (1912), 340 (1910), 341 (1914), 342 (1877).
8. Thorne v. Thorne, 210 App. Div. 55, 205 N.Y. Supp. 284 (1st Dep't 1924); Steinback
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proceedings, even though he has perfected his appeal, section 573 will not save him
from having the judgment executed and he may ultimately have to resort to restitution.9 In a recent case it was held that section 573 must be read in conjunction with
section 614,10 with the result that perfecting an appeal does not result in staying proceedings unless a statute explicitly so provides."1 Hence, where there is no provision in
the Civil Practice Act for a specific type of undertaking, the appellant must also gct
an order granting a stay of execution or he may well find himself, though successful
in his appeal, being obliged to seek restitution.
Only minor changes in wording were made in section 573 prior to 1945.12 Section
573, in conjunction with sections 614, 615, and 593-601"3 codified the procedures
surrounding the staying of execution pending appeal. In 1945 this section as well as all
others having a bearing on this general subject, underwent a thorough re-evaluation by
14
the Judicial Council, whose recommendations were subsequently enacted into law.
In the Judicial Council's Eleventh Annual Report the words, "if any," after the
phrase, "and the other acts," in section 573 were proposed to be deleted, thereby
removing once and for all any possible implication that the stay would automatically
result from merely perfecting the appeal. 1
Another recommendation in this report, which was likewise subsequently incorporated
in section 573,16 concerned the protection of the appellant who had a right of further
appeal. This action gave rise to the insertion of the five day stay of execution heretofore mentioned. As the law stood prior to this enactment, there was a possibility that
upon affirmance, the respondent could at once enter judgment in the court below, without notice to the appellant, thereby terminating the stay and allowing execution even
though a further appeal could be taken. Such a possibility was contrary to the whole
purpose of the section. As recommended and subsequently amended, the section provides that a five day stay results after affirmance or modification, from the time
respondent serves written notice of the entry of judgment on appellant's attorney. This
gives the appellant time to carry his appeal further and make whatever overtures are
necessary to the court to stay execution pending the determination of the new appeal.
Thus the section's basic aim was implemented. But it was this five day period during
which procedures were stayed that gave rise to the amendment here under discussion.
As can be seen from the language of section 573, the stay only applies to ordinary
proceedings in the action which may be taken by the respondent to enforce the action. 17
The court below is specifically empowered to proceed in any matter included in the
action or special proceeding and not affected by the order or judgment appealed from.
Such matters have been held to include the appointment of a receiver to replace one
v. Diepenbrock, 5 App. Div. 208, 39 N.Y. Supp. 137 (1st Dep't 1896); Taft v. Marslly, 49
Hun 163 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1st Dep't 1888).
9. The old § 1310 omitted a specific way to stay by suppling security and merely said the
judgment or order was not to be stayed by a perfected appeal unless the "other acts, If any,
required to be done have been done." These acts are to include statutory requirements and
those required by the practice of the court. Ex parte Meyer, 209 N.Y. 59, 102 N.E. 606 (1913).
10. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 614 (1945).

11.
12.
Laws
13.
14.

In re Bologna, 199 Misc. 705, 102 N.Y. Supp. 2d 420 (N.Y. Dom. Rd. Ct. 1950).
N.Y. Laws c. 4 (1893); N.Y. Laws c. 946 (1895); N.Y. Laws c. 29 (1898); N.Y.
c. 293 (1917).
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 593-601 (1945), 615 (1945).
N.Y. Laws c. 841 (1945).

15. Eleventh N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. at 284 (1945).
16. See note 14 supra.
17. Seeman v. Reich, N.Y. Daily Reg. (June 23, 1882).
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who declined to serve before the judgment,18 entertaining a motion for alimony
pendente lite, 19 or allowing the institution of a new action against joint debtors not
served in the action in which the judgment appealed from was obtained.20
One of the matters included in the action, "not affected by the judgment or order
appealed from," and over which the court from whose determination the appeal is
taken retains jurisdiction, is a motion for a new trial. It is well established by a long
line of cases that in New York the pendency21of an appeal should not operate to bar
a motion in the court below for a new trial.
While a court has inherent power to direct a new trial where the circumstances are
proper2 2 and may do so on its own motion,2 a trial judge may decline to hear the
24
motion and forward it to special term.
What matters may be grounds for a new trial and before whom the motions may be
made are covered in sections 549 to 552 of the Civil Practice Act. Section 549 provides
for the motion for a new trial on the minutes of the trial judge, such motion to be
made at trial term within a specified period. 25 Grounds include exceptions, excessive or
insufficient verdicts for damages, or where the verdict or decision is contrary to the
evidence or the law.2 6 Where the grounds are surprise,27 newly discovered evidence, failure to render a decision, 29 or misconduct of a party to the action 30 or counsel3 ' the
motion is properly made at special term-though a motion on the grounds included
under section 549 may also be made at special term.
Though a number of jurisdictions do not allow a trial court to keep jurisdiction over
18.
aff'd,
19.
20.

MacKellar v. Farrell, 29 N.Y.S.R. 350, 8 N.Y. Supp. 307 (Gen. T. N.Y. Ct. 1890),
134 N.Y. 597, 31 N.E. 629 (1892).
Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 78 App. Div. 577, 79 N.Y. Supp. 566 (2d Dep't 1903).
Morey v. Tracey, 92 N.Y. 581 (1883).

21.

Klehnmnan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 298 N.Y. 217, 81 N.E. 2d 818 (1948); Waldo

v. Schmidt, 200 N.Y. 199, 93 N.E. 477 (1910); Henry v. Allen, 147 N.Y. 346, 41 N.E. 694

(1895); City of Beacon v. Asher Bernstein Realty Corp., 270 App. Div. 852, 60 N.Y. Supp.
2d 616 (2d Dep't 1946) ; Jennings v. Doyle, 263 App. Div. 488, 33 N.Y. Supp. 2d 695 (3d
Dep't 1942); Liesney v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 166 App. Div. 625, 151 N.Y. Supp. 134
(4th Dep't 1915) ; Bulkley v. Whiting Mfg. Co, 136 App. Div. 479, 121 N.Y. Supp. 159 (1st
Dep't 1910); Buffalo Cold Storage Co. v. Bacon, 136 App. Div. 263, 120 N.Y. Supp. 960
(4th Dep't 1910); Smith v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 60 App. Div. 467, 69 N.Y. Supp. 975 (2d
Dep't 1901); Vernier v. Knauth, 7 App. Div. 57, 39 N.Y. Supp. 784 (1st Dep't 1896).
22. Stoddard v. Stoddard, 37 N.Y. Supp. 2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, sub nom. Re Acker,
264 App. Div. 980, 37 N.Y. Supp. 2d 488 (3d Dep't 1942).
23. Schmidt v. Brown, 80 Hun 183, 30 N.Y. Supp. 68 (Gea. T. 3d Dep't 1894).
24. Stern v. Wabash Ry. Co., 52 MIsc. 12, 101 N.Y. Supp. 181 (Sp. T. N.Y. Co. 1906).
25. Weaver v. Scripture, 125 M isc. 741, 211 N.Y. Supp. 593 (Sup. Ct. Sp. T. 1925), afT'd,
214 App. Div. 852, 211 N.Y. Supp. 940 (4th Dep't 1925); Rules of Civ. Prac. § 60-a (1951).
26. Hummel v. L. S. Fischl's Son, Inc., 175 App. Div. 489, 162 N.Y. Supp. 150 (1st Dep't
1916); Magnus v. Buffalo Ry. Co., 24 App. Div. 449, 48 N.Y. Supp. 490 (4th Dep't 1897).
27. Stoddard v. Stoddard, 37 N.Y. Supp. 2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, sub nom. Re
Acker, 264 App. Div. 980, 37 N.Y. Supp. 2d 488 (3d Dep't 1942).
28. Tavitsky v. Schamroth, 277 App. Div. 1018, 100 N.Y. Supp. 2d 317 (Ist Dep't 1950);
Oakdale Contracting Co. v. City of New York, 262 App. Div. 494, 30 N.Y. Supp. 2d 545 (1st
Dep't 1941).
29. Hodecker v. Hodecker, 39 App. Div. 353, 56 N.Y. Supp. 954 (4th Dep't 1899).
30. Corley v. New York and Harlem Ry. Co., 12 App. Div. 409, 42 N.Y. Supp. 941 (1st
Dep't 1896).
31. Cosselmon v. Dunfee, 172 N.Y. 507, 65 N.E. 494 (1902).
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a motion for a new trial while an appeal is pending, 32 it is firmly established in New
York that such jurisdiction is retained.33 Any possibility of circumvention, however
remote, would therefore, of necessity, have to be promptly obviated.
There is no trend evident in this state towards an attenuation of this judicial prerogative. On the contrary, it was obviously not the purpose of the five day extension of stay
incorporated in the section in 1945 to operate as a forbidden zone as far as the judicial
power of the lower court to grant a new trial goes. The amendment under discussion
here clearly spells out that the lower court's jurisdiction to entertain such a motion
shall be retained during this five day period. It operates as a further clarification of the
state's basic procedural theory and is therefore beneficial in every respect.

NEW YORK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, SECTIOq 26.-CHILD BoRN AFTER MAKING OF
WILL.-Chapter 225 of the Session Laws of 1955 amends section 26 of the Decedent
Estate Law so as to render the right of a child born after the making of a will, subject
to a valid power of sale.
Former section 26 of the Decedent Estate Law grants to a child born after the
making of a will, either in the lifetime or after the death of the testator, a share in
such parent's estate as would have descended to the child had the testator died intestate, when such child is neither provided for nor in any way mentioned in the will. 1
Section 28 of the same law2 empowers such after-born child to maintain an action
against the legatees or devisees to recover his share of the estate to which he is entitled
to succeed. Under this statute, adopted children have all of the rights of a natural
child 3 and it has been held that a foster child, adopted subsequent to the execution of
the foster parent's will, has a right, as an after-born child, to an intestate share of his
parent's estate under the provisions of this enactment. 4 Section 26 had been embodied
in the Revised Statutes5 and, as originally enacted, did not affect a will executed by
the mother but only a will of the father.6 The laws of 1869 amended this section so
7
that it would apply to mothers as well as to fathers.
At common law the disposition of a parent's estate was not affected by a child born
after the making of a will, but a subsequent marriage and birth of issue generally
effected a revocation of a prior will. 8 However, under the civil law a subsequent birth
of a child effected a nullification of a will even where there was no subsequent mar32. Midland Terminal Ry. Co. v. Warinner, 294 F. 185 (8th Cir. 1923); MacMahon v.
Dozier, 237 Ala. 574, 187 So. 710 (1939) ; Great American Ins. Co. v. Suarez, 107 Fla. 705,
146 So. 644 (1932) ; Edwards v. State, 125 Ga. 5, 53 S.E. 579 (1906) ; Elgin Lumber Co. v.
Langmon, 23 Ill. App. 250 (1887) ; State v. Sangster, 196 Iowa 495, 192 N.W. 155 (1923) ;
State v. Alvarez, 182 La. 905, 162 So. 725 (1935) ; Hughes v. Richter, 239 Mich. 110, 214

N.W. 175 (1927); Samples v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. Rep. 418, 190 S.W. 486 (1916).
33. See note 21 supra.
1. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 26.
2. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 28 (1931)

was formerly § 1868 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.
3. Matter of Guilmartin, 277 N.Y. 689, 14 N.E. 2d 627 (1938); In re Meng's Will, 201
Misc. 589, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 263, (Surr. Ct. 1952).
4.

In re Upjohn's Will, 304 N.Y. 366, 107 N.E. 2d 492 (1952).

5.

2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 65, § 49 (1828).

6. Cotheal v. Cotheal, 40 N.Y. 405 (1869).
7.

N.Y. Laws c. 22, § 1 (1869).

8. Wormer v. Crose, 120 App. Div. 287, 104 N.Y. Supp. 1090 (1st Dep't 1907).
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riage.9 The object of the civil law rule was ". . not to secure equality of distribution
but to guard against inadvertent or unintentional disinheritance."' 0 The present statutory provision, as derived from civil law position, is directed toward providing against
testamentary thoughtlessness of the possibility of after-born children, and providing a
scheme for the disposition of the testators property when such thoughtlessness occurs."
Section 26 becomes operative when an after-born child is "... . unprovided for by
any settlement, nor in any way mentioned in such will."' 2 The legislature has not
specified the character or content of a settlement and it has been stated that such a
determination in each case presents a fact situation in which the character and size of
the provision for the after-born child, the circumstances under which it was made, and
the value of the entire estate are considered with a view to determining whether the
parent's intent was directed toward an out-of-will provision to fill the office of a
settlement. 13 In such a consideration, the parent's intent, rather than form or method,
is the all-important issue14 and "... any act of the testator indicating an intention to
make future provision would fulfill the requirement .. ." for a settlemenLt . '5 Such a
settlement may be effected prior, simultaneously, or subsequent to the execution of a
will. 16 Where there is no such settlement the courts will then seek to determine if
the child was provided for or mentioned in some way in the will. To preclude an afterborn child from succession by virtue of this statute, by reason of his being mentioned
in the will, it would seemingly be necessary that the will explicitly dispose of property
in favor of such child or manifest an intention to omit any dispository provision for
17

him.

Chapter 225 of the Session Laws of 1955 amended section 26 so as to render this
right of an after-born child subject to a valid power of sale expressed in the will or
implied pursuant to the provisions of section 13 of the same law.' 8 This amendment
was precipitated by a conflict of decisions concerning this question. In 1882, the Court
of Appeals, in the case of Smith v. Robertson,'9 was presented with a situation wherein
an after-born child who, by reason of the statutory forerunner of section 26 as contained in the Revised Statutesi ° sought to recover possession of real property which
an executor, by a power of sale expressed in the will, had sold to defendant. The court
held that the real property descended to the child, under the stated statutory provision,
in the same manner as it would have descended if the father had died intestate, and
that the child did not take under the will, or subject to any of its provisions. Thus,
the sale of the real property by the executor did not confine the remedy of the child
9. Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 506 (1820).
10. See note 8 supra.
11. McLean v. McLean, 207 N.Y. 365, 101 N.E. 178 (1913); Tavshanjian v. Abbott, 200
N.Y. 374, 93 N.E. 978 (1911).
12.

See note 1 supra.

13. Matter of Faber, 305 N.Y. 200, 111 N.E. 2d 883 (1953).
14. In re Sorensen's Will, 205 M~isc. 26, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 837 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
15. Matter of Brant, 121 Misc. 102, 104, 201 N.Y. Supp. 60, 61 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
16. In re Anderson's Will, 205 Misc. 151, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 163 (Surr. Ct 1954).
17. Bourne v. Dorney, 184 App. Div. 476, 171 N.Y. Supp. 264, (2d Dep't 1918), affd,
227 N.Y. 641, 126 N.E. 901 (1918).
18. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 13 (1947). This section provides the statutory power of
an executor or trustee to take possession, sell, mortgage or lease real property owned by the
decedent at the time of his death when such power is not contained in the will.
19. 89 N.Y. 555 (1882).
20. See note 5 supra.
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to a pursuit of the proceeds of the sale but permitted said child to maintain an action
in ejectment.
The apparent settled law as expressed in the Smith v. Robertson decision, that the
right of an after-born child was not subject to a valid power of sale, was invaded by
the comparatively recent holding of In re Smith's Wil.2l There, a testator survived by
his widow who was named in the will as his sole legatee and devisee, and by an after
born child who qualified to succeed to her intestate share under section 26, gave to his
executrix a general power of sale and disposition over his real and personal property. In a
proceeding brought for an order for the sale of real property of which decedent died
seized, a motion by the special guardian of the after-born child to dismiss the proceeding for want of jurisdiction was granted. This motion was based upon the provisions of
the Surrogate's Court Act2 2 which in effect provide that the proceeding to sell real
property, with which the court was then concerned, cannot be maintained where there
is a valid power of sale expressed in the will of the decedent. The court recognized
the right of the after-born child to her intestate share of the decedent's estate but, in
granting the motion to dismiss, ruled that such right was subject to a valid power of
sale which was expressed in the will. The court was of the opinion that the rule as
stated in Smith v. Robertson was authority only for the conceivable case where a
decedent's estate, contrary to the provisions of his will, devolved solely to an afterborn child; however, when the after-born child is entitled to only a portion of the
estate, his right is subject to a power of sale contained in the will. Although the rule
set forth in Smith v. Robertson did not contain this qualification, and although the
facts in that case are not distinguishable from In re Smith's Will, the court stated that
were the present case carried to the Court of Appeals it would receive an affirmance.
This opinion was based upon what the court termed a distinction in law, i.e., subsequent
to the Smith v. Robertson decision, sections 8323 and 47-c 24 of the Decedent Estate
Law were enacted so that in cases where there is a surviving spouse real property no
longer descends solely to an after-born, or any other, child of the decedent.
Whatever the merits of these two conflicting theories, the legislature by the enactment of this chapter amending this statutory provision has settled the question in this
state. It may now be definitely stated that the right of an after-born child taking
pursuant to section 26 is subject to a valid power of sale contained, either expressly
or impliedy, in the will.

NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY LAW, SECTION 294-REcORDING OPTIONS To PURCIIASE
OR LEASE.-Chapter 552 of the Session Laws of 1955 amends section 294 of the Real

Property Law so as to classify options to purchase or lease real property as executory
contracts within the meaning of said section, except that the recording of the option
agreement shall be effective only up to and including the last day fixed by the agreement for the exercise of the option.
This amendment nullifies Davidson v. Fox1 which limited instruments recordable
under section 294 to executory contracts for the sale or purchase of land and to powers
of attorney authorizing the sale of land.
Early cases held that the only purpose for recording a contract of sale was to
21. 107 N.Y.S. 2d 993, 202 Misc. 64 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
22. N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act § 233 (1935).
23. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 83 (1938).
24. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 47-c (1938).

1. 65 App. Div. 262, 73 N.Y. Supp. 533 (lst Dep't 1901).
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preserve evidence and to facilitate proof.2 It was also held that a contract of sale did
not, of itself, constitute an encumbrance or lien upon real estate or a cloud upon title
and the recording of it did not in any way add to its force and validity.3 A later
statute required the recording officer of each county to keep different sets of books
for the recording of deeds and of mortgages and it was provided that in the deed
libers there shall be recorded ".. . all executory contracts for the sale, purchase or
exchange of real property, or memoranda thereof, and all instruments canceling or
extending such contracts, which conveyances, contracts or instruments are delivered to
him, pursuant to law, to be so recorded . .. ."4 However in 1931, in Schultz and Son,
Inc. v. Nelson,5 it was held that although the statute permitted the recording of
executory contracts of sale, the recording was not constructive notice to subsequent
purchasers. This case pointed up the inadequacy of the existing statutory provision
to afford the purchaser full protection by the recording of his executory contract.
Recognizing this inadequacy, the Law Revision Commission recommended an amendment to section 294.1 In accordance therewith, the statute was amended to provide
that the recording, thereunder, of a contract of sale of real property shall constitute
constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers. 8
In 1933, in Wheeler v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., the court held that a purchaser
who accepts a deed with full knowledge of a lessee's option to purchase land under his
lease takes the land subject to that option. Since at this time options could not be
recorded under section 294,10 the giving of constructive notice thereby was precluded.
Thus, an option agreement was afforded the same inadequate recognition under the
recording act as an executory contract was prior to the aforesaid amendment to section
294. It was, therefore, only consistent for the legislature again to amend section 294
to provide that the recording of option agreements should constitute constructive notice
up to and including the last date upon which the option agreement may be executed.
The addition of this amendment seems to be in line with the rationale underlying
the recording act, ie., to afford complete protection to a purchaser, or prospective
purchaser, against the possibility of being cut off by a subsequent purchaser, when
the latter can, by the exercise of minimum diligence, have the title searched and fully
protect himself. This common form of business transaction, an option agreement,
would be entirely impractical without such protection.
2. Washburn v. Burnham, 63 N.Y. 132 (1875) ;Boyd v. Schlesinger, 59 N.Y. 301 (1874).

3.
4.
5.
6.

Ibid.
N.Y. Real Property Law § 315 (1944).
256 N.Y. 473, 177 N.E. 9 (1931).
Reports of The Law Revision Commison, at 163 (1940).
7. N.Y. Laws c. 745 (1940).
8. N.Y. Real Property Law § 294 (1944).
9. 263 N.Y. 34, 188 N.E. 148 (1933).
10. See note 1 supra.

